Russia learned a costly lesson: calling unmanned vessels "toys" doesn't stop them from sinking warships.
Ukraine's success (either alone or with its supporters) in the Black Sea forced Moscow to change its approach. From initial underestimation, it moved to copying and now to the organized development of a domestic ecosystem of unmanned surface and underwater platforms.
Russia is now developing its own hulls, propulsion systems, sonar, sensors and software.
Progress is real.
But there is a significant weakness.
Autonomy is not just the boat. It's the entire chain.
Ukraine changed its naval doctrine
Relatively cheap Ukrainian USVs helped to drive large Russian warships away from Sevastopol and limit their operational freedom.
The result was more than just a tactical defeat.
It was a lesson in strategy.
The so-called "mosquito fleet" is no longer a mere nuisance. Russia is creating special unmanned formations and integrating USVs into its naval operations.
Drones are becoming part of the fleet.
Russia is not starting from scratch.
Let us not overlook the fact that St. Petersburg is home to one of the most important Russian centers for hydroacoustic research and development of naval sonar, which is a global standard.
That's why I'm wary of the idea that Russia is simply "copying" Ukraine.
Russian technological capabilities are unknown. But underwater technology is an area in which it has decades of respected experience.
It also builds nuclear-powered submarines, and is particularly familiar with active sonar.
So, the Russian effort in USVs should neither be underestimated nor treated as something completely new.
The ship is not the mission.
Russia is developing platforms such as Orkan, Vizir and Vizir-2M, as well as underwater systems such as the MPA ROV.
The common trend is modular architecture: different sonars and sensors can be adapted depending on the mission.
This is important.
A USV does not gain operational value simply because it can operate without a crew.
The real value lies in what it can:
- detect,
- recognize,
- processed,
- communicate,
- and ultimately allow the operator or the system to decide which of the available options to implement.
*The boat is the means of transportation.
**The payload is the mission.
The weak link may be communications
Herein lies perhaps Russia's biggest problem.
The country can now manufacture hulls, engines, navigation and sonar. Secure long-range satellite communications are a more difficult proposition.
His case Murena-300S, where analysts spotted a possible Starlink antenna, highlighted this weakness.
Russia is trying to fill the gap with Rassvet, its own emerging low-orbit satellite constellation.
But Rassvet is still in its early stages and is significantly short of the scale and operational maturity of Starlink.
And here is the crucial point:
Without reliable communications beyond the horizon, autonomy becomes much more difficult.
The system must then decide more on its own.
This requires powerful processing, reliable software, understanding of the environment, and clear rules of action when communication is lost.
*Removing the person from the boat does not eliminate the need for decision-making.
It simply shifts decision-making from the operator to the system.
The drone doesn't even have to attack
Another lesson came from the incident near the Neptun Deep gas project in Romania.
An unmanned aerial vehicle can create a strategic effect even without hitting anything.
It can force a country to deploy aircraft and warships, disrupt operations, increase insurance costs, and create uncertainty around critical energy infrastructure.
Sometimes the real strategic payload is not an explosive charge.
It's the uncertainty.
The basic lesson
Russia is really making progress in naval drones.
But autonomy is a chain.
And the weakest link may not be the hull or the sonar.
It could be communications.
Or data processing.
Or the integration of systems.
Or, ultimately, human trust in the system.
That's why, when designing an autonomous platform, the first question shouldn't be:
"Which boat should we buy?"
The correct question is:
"What does the mission need to detect, understand, communicate, and achieve?"
Why an impressive drone is not necessarily a useful operational capability.
*The platform is just the beginning.
**The mission is the goal.
It is good for Greece to take advantage of this "free teaching", as long as it does not pay for it with blood in general and in the Aegean in particular!
Photo By Jeff Schmaltz, MODIS Rapid Response Team, NASA/GSFC – visibleearth.nasa.gov: Description pagevisibleearth.nasa.gov: BlackSea.A2004143.1105.250m.jpg or eoimages.gsfc.nasa.gov: BlackSea.A2004143.1105.250m.jpg, Public Domain, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=6865919, https://el.wikipedia.org/wiki/
