In a world moving from the globalization of efficiency to the geo-economy of security, the upcoming meeting between US President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping in Washington is not just about tariffs, the trade balance or bilateral relations. Xi is making an official visit to the United States from September 23 to 25, 2026, with an official reception at the White House scheduled for September 24. Trade, rare earths, artificial intelligence, technology restrictions and broader issues of strategic stability are on the agenda.
But behind the individual negotiations lies a much deeper shift. The world's two largest economies are trying to answer the same question: How can an economy remain open and at the same time not be vulnerable?
For about three decades, globalization was organized around efficiency. Businesses sought the cheapest factory, the most economical supplier, and the shortest production chain. The basic principle was simple: produce where the cost is lowest and transport the product to where the demand is.
Today this logic is changing. The crucial question is no longer just “where is it produced cheaper?”, but also “what happens if tomorrow this supplier stops supplying us?”.
Economic interdependence turns into a strategic risk: The United States and China are perhaps the best examples of this new reality. The two economies remain deeply interdependent, but at the same time they are trying to reduce their most critical dependencies.
Washington is seeking greater domestic or allied manufacturing capacity in semiconductors, batteries, critical minerals and advanced technologies. Beijing, on the other hand, is accelerating its technological autonomy, seeking to reduce its dependence on American chips, software and technology platforms.
At the same time, rare earths have become a central bargaining chip. The US side is pushing for an easing of Chinese restrictions on exports of critical minerals, while China is seeking an easing of restrictions on access to advanced US technologies.
The issue is not just commercial. An advanced semiconductor can be used in a car, a data center, an artificial intelligence system, or military equipment. A rare earth can be essential for electric vehicles, wind turbines, electronics, and advanced defense systems. This means that supply chains are no longer simple commercial mechanisms. They have become national power infrastructures.
From efficiency to durability: Economic resilience does not mean self-sufficiency. No large economy can produce everything on its own without enormous cost. But it does mean that critical dependencies must be manageable.
An economy is resilient when it has alternative energy suppliers, diversified trade relations, secure digital networks, an adequate productive base, and the ability to continue operating when a critical international flow is disrupted. This is precisely the transition from simple economic efficiency to strategic resilience.
The problem is that resilience comes at a cost. The most efficient business may have a single supplier, minimal inventory, and a large factory in a low-cost country. The most resilient business needs two or three suppliers, more inventory, different transportation routes, and often production facilities in different geographic locations.
In strict accounting terms, this is more expensive. In geoeconomic terms, however, it is a form of insurance. The US and China are essentially negotiating today not the end of their interdependence, but the terms of this interdependence.
Artificial intelligence at the center of the new controversy: Artificial intelligence adds a new dimension. The two governments have already agreed to establish a formal dialogue on AI security issues, and a new meeting of officials has been announced in Shenzhen within the next two months. The discussions will include communication mechanisms in the event of incidents related to advanced AI systems.
This is important because AI is not just a new software application. It requires a huge physical infrastructure: advanced semiconductors, data centers, electricity, networks, cooling systems, data, and skilled human capital. In other words, whoever controls the critical levels of this chain gains economic as well as strategic power.
This is where technology and resilience meet. A country can have a strong economy, but if it depends on a single external supplier for advanced chips, critical minerals, or cloud infrastructure, that dependence can become a leverage point in times of conflict. A state’s power in the 21st century increasingly depends on its access to capital, energy, semiconductors, data, digital networks, and many other networks.
The new equilibrium: not disconnection, but “controlled dependence”: This explains why a complete US–China economic decoupling is extremely difficult and likely extremely costly.
The two countries may compete in AI, chips, batteries, and critical technologies, but they still need each other's market, capital, technology, or production base in many areas.
Notably, even an American battery startup, EnerVenue, recently chose to build its first factory in China instead of Kentucky, citing its extensive supplier network, available engineering expertise, and lower costs. The case shows that manufacturing resilience is not created simply by tariffs or subsidies; it requires entire industrial ecosystems. Conversely, many Chinese startups prefer to go public in the US.
This is perhaps the most important lesson for Europe. The factory is not just the building. It is the suppliers, the engineers, the energy network, the logistics, the skills, the financing and the know-how that surround it.
The US-China meeting concerns the entire world: The Trump-Xi meeting is therefore more important than a classic trade negotiation. Both sides have an interest in limiting the risk of an uncontrolled economic rupture, but without abandoning efforts to limit their strategic vulnerabilities.
China says it seeks "strategic stability," more dialogue and dispute management, while the US side has linked the talks to issues of trade, unfair competition, critical minerals, investment and technology.
The result is not necessarily a return to the old globalization. It is more likely that a different globalization will take shape: more cooperation where interests coincide, more competition in critical technologies, and greater diversification in strategic supply chains.
The basic measure of economic power is changing. It is no longer enough for a country to have a high GDP. It must be able to maintain its production, energy, digital services, and financing when the international system is shocked.
It is not enough to have access to critical flows. It must be able to replace them when they are interrupted. It is not enough to be efficient. It must be able to absorb the crisis.
That's why economic resilience is becoming one of the most important indicators of national strength. The strongest country is not necessarily the one that is independent of anyone — something that is almost impossible in the modern economy. It is the one that can manages its dependencies and prevent interdependence from turning into unilateral vulnerability.
The US-China meeting shows us exactly this new reality. The two superpowers are not just trying to win more trade. They are trying to decide what dependence they can afford, what technology they must control, and what networks they cannot leave in each other’s hands.
In the 21st century, economic power will not be measured solely by how cheaply you can produce.
It will be measured by how quickly you can adapt when the world stops functioning as we know it.
photo RGY23, https://pixabay.com
