Donald Trump boasts that he has ended eight wars to date. Yet he is likely already waging a new war in the Caribbean – the third real war of his new term. That is a remarkable number of conflicts in just eleven months. And of course, this tally does not include the ongoing, so far discreet, war against the Islamic State and al-Qaeda.
The first war, against the Houthis in Yemen, was officially launched in January 2024 by the Joe Biden administration, with the aim of restoring freedom of navigation in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. The Donald Trump ordered the continuation of airstrikes between March 15 and May 6, 2025, as part of the operation codenamed "Tough Rider".
On May 6, 2025, it announced the end of the attacks, as a result of a ceasefire agreed between the United States and the Houthis. Despite the use of more than 2000 rounds of ammunition of all types, the American newspaper New York Times concluded that the United States failed to achieve air superiority over the Houthis, while at the same time wasting a significant portion of its ammunition stockpiles.
The second war was fragmentary and relatively limited and concerned Iran. It began with the protection of American bases in Iraq from attacks by the pro-Iranian Popular Mobilization Forces, continued with the defense of Israeli airspace during the two phases of the Iran-Israel war, and culminated in direct attacks on Iranian nuclear targets in Operation Midnight Hammer on June 21. The effects were clearly more noticeable compared to those of the operations against the Houthis, but they seem to have been temporary.
Combined with the operations of his first term – limited attacks on Syria and Iran, as well as the acceptance of defeat in Afghanistan – a distinct Trump “war model” is taking shape: He does not shy away from the use of military force, as long as it is low-risk and does not involve losses of ground forces. He opposes operations to conquer and control territory, which require a long-term presence and acceptance of losses, while he prefers limited secret raids and, above all, spectacular long-range attacks.
Trump's wars
Trump’s warmaking relies on high-profile actions, with the perception of the outcome being almost as important to him as the outcome itself. However, it is a very expensive way to wage war: The munitions used against the Houthis alone are estimated to have cost around $5 billion, while Operation Midnight Hammer cost around $200 million in a single night.
It is worth noting that none of these operations were approved in advance by Congress. Donald Trump is invoking his constitutional capacity as Commander in Chief, acting to protect American forces and freedom of navigation, as well as the Congressional Authorizations for the Use of Military Force of 2001 and 2002. These authorizations, without time limits, authorize the use of force against al-Qaeda and affiliated organizations, as well as to protect American interests in Iraq.
This practice, which has been in place for nearly two decades, gives the President extremely broad discretion, limiting Congress’s role to an after-the-fact briefing. In this light, the legal basis for Operation Midnight Hammer against Iran – like the killing of Qassem Soleimani in 2020 – could be seriously questioned; however, discussions on this were quickly halted.
New Monroe Doctrine and the Caribbean
Last week, the House of Representatives rejected two resolutions that would have required President Trump to seek congressional approval before attacking Venezuela and to continue his naval operations in the Caribbean. As a result, we are witnessing the first application of a revised Monroe Doctrine – which may soon be dubbed the “Trump Doctrine” – aimed at regaining control of the United States’ so-called “natural” sphere of influence, from Greenland to Tierra del Fuego.
The method is particularly aggressive: Initially, an armada costing approximately $40 billion is deployed, which includes the world's most powerful aircraft carrier strike group, an Amphibious Marine Unit of approximately 2000 men with organic support assets and helicopters, a squadron of six surface ships and two attack submarines capable of launching up to 250 Tomahawk missiles.
At the same time, Puerto Rico has been transformed into a “land-based aircraft carrier”, with a force of 15 F-35 fighters, three P-8 Poseidon aircraft, six Reaper drones, aerial refueling aircraft, electronic warfare assets, as well as heavy and light transport aircraft. In addition, two wings of B-52H and B-1B strategic bombers are available from bases in Louisiana and Texas. Finally, special forces also have a significant presence, even within Venezuelan territory. However, together with the Marine Amphibious Unit, they are the only element that could support limited land operations.
The deployment of these forces in the Caribbean requires gigantic resources, which few states could muster, even if they deployed all of their armed forces. And all this for what purpose? In fact, we do not know for sure, beyond exerting strategic pressure on Venezuela, with the aim of preventing the regime of Nicolas Maduro from any "adventure", as well as sending a clear message to the rest of the world about who controls the region.
At a cost of nearly $1 million per hour of operation, this show of force seems extremely expensive. It could, however, serve a more specific purpose, such as systematically destroying drug-trafficking boats passing through the area of responsibility of Operation Southern Spear. To date, 26 such small boats have been destroyed, with a toll of 99 deaths and the arrest of two people, who were subsequently released.
The war on drugs
The use of military means – special forces, covert operations or even private companies – against drug cartels is not in itself new. The United States has been doing so for decades, but without openly admitting it, for one simple reason: Killing people without trial and outside the context of self-defense is illegal in peacetime. Policing and war are the two legitimate uses of the state monopoly on violence, but they are governed by different legal regimes.
In policing, violence is used against people for acts they commit or attempt to commit, and under strict restrictions. In contrast, in war, violence is used against people for what they are: Fighters of a hostile political entity, with restrictions only on the protection of civilians. Since cartels are not political organizations, like jihadist groups, much less states, but purely criminal entities, dealing with them cannot normally be included in the context of war.
One could choose to deal with drug cartels “like war” and kill their members simply for what they are. But that inevitably amounts to extrajudicial execution and, therefore, must be done secretly. But then it directly contradicts the successive Executive Orders of Presidents Ford, Carter, and Reagan, which explicitly prohibit murder by government agencies.
The Trump administration’s innovation is that it not only does not hide the killing of drug traffickers, but on the contrary boasts about it, citing the urgent need to combat the drug scourge. The burden falls in particular on fentanyl, which comes mainly from Mexico and is responsible for the deaths of tens of thousands of Americans every year. It is not surprising that almost every Attorney General internationally has expressed serious objections to this practice, especially to the operations of the Southern Command, considering them to be pure extrajudicial killings, capable of leading to criminal prosecutions of the military leaders involved. The commander of the Southern Command, Admiral Alvin Halsey, is said to have tacitly approved this line, leaving early shortly after the operation began.
Ignoring these objections, the Trump administration was ultimately forced to go beyond the dubious justification of “urgency,” invoking self-defense and, most importantly—and most worryingly—declaring war. Declaring war presupposes the identification of a political enemy, who will be the object of extreme violence. In this case, the enemy was defined as Cartel of the Suns, which was added in November to the list of foreign terrorist organizations, along with Venezuela's Tren de Aragua and Mexico's Sinaloa Cartel.
The label of "terrorist" eIt is conceptually problematic, but politically powerful: enough to demonize the target and at the same time vague enough to be applied at will. It seems that in Washington, the simple identification of an entity as an “enemy” is enough to automatically justify action against it under the laws and practices of war. Thus, criminals are transformed into “enemy irregular combatants,” such as jihadists, and treated as legitimate targets for immediate neutralization.
Conclusions
Looking ahead to the paradoxical Operation South Pole, it becomes clear that a $1 million-an-hour operation cannot continue indefinitely, especially given its limited impact. The costly destruction of a few small boats does little to address the drug scourge, while the deliberate publicity of the operation for prestige reasons increases the risk of serious mistakes. In a media-driven environment, the recklessness of a single corporal could jeopardize the entire operation.
Moreover, the role of the “tactical minister” is becoming increasingly visible, directly intervening in the command of units in conflict, with the risk of worsening the situation. The example of the second attack ordered by War Secretary Pete Hegseth to eliminate survivors of a first attack is typical, which demonstrates why such controversial operations are traditionally conducted in secrecy.
At the same time, the goals tend to adapt. What will happen if speedboats start systematically transporting innocent hostages? What will happen, above all, when traffickers choose alternative routes? Remote warfare presents the same advantages and the same limitations here as in the case of the Houthis: you can weaken the opponent without friendly losses, but at a cost of billions and without a decisive result.
But perhaps Operation Southern Spear is primarily a show-off for the American public. If the real target is indeed the Maduro regime, it is not clear how the waves from large ships and the attacks from small boats can hasten its downfall. The United States has imposed increasingly stringent economic sanctions on Venezuela since 2015, and especially on oil since 2019. However, sanctions alone have never been sufficient to provoke a revolution or a regime collapse.
Military action remains an option in theory, but this is where Trump’s war model comes into play. You can influence an adversary’s political behavior through airstrikes, but you can’t overthrow a regime with them alone. That requires armed men to march on Miraflores Palace – preferably Venezuelans.
Otherwise, the Americans would have to shoulder the burden of overthrowing themselves, as in Operation Just Cause in Panama in 1989, with charges against Maduro similar to those leveled at Manuel Noriega. But such a possibility presupposes accepting the risk of human casualties – and so far, the Donald Trump He has not shown that he is willing to take that risk.
source https://slpress.gr/diethni/oi-polemoi-tou-trab-kai-to-neo-dogma-m
photo thiemen, https://pixabay.com
