The head of the KYP in Kyrenia describes in "Detections" how he monitored the Turkish war machine moving towards Cyprus and constantly sent information to Athens, without any measures being taken.
A shocking testimony about the dramatic hours before and during the Turkish invasion of Cyprus was given by Alexandros Simioforidis on Pantelis Savvidis's show "Explorations".
The man who in the summer of 1974 was in charge of the KYP team in Kyrenia described how he had been monitoring the preparations of the Turkish troops for months, how he had been continuously informing Athens, and how, despite the volume and seriousness of the information, no one from the center mobilized.
His testimony is not an afterthought. It is the testimony of an officer who was in the field, watching the Turks' movements, recording their communications, and, in the early hours of July 20, 1974, watching the landing fleet appear in front of Kyrenia.
And when Pantelis Savvidis asked him whether there was ultimately betrayal or incompetence, Simioforidis's answer was disarming:
"If I say both together? Incompetence, which then also causes betrayal. Both together."
The warnings began in April.
Alexandros Simioforidis was posted to Cyprus in 1969, partly due to his knowledge of the Turkish language. For the first four years of his mission, he served in Kyrenia, systematically monitoring the activities of Turkish military formations opposite the island.
As he explained, the Turkish landing exercises were usually held in September and involved one of the three regiments of the 39th Division in rotation. In 1974, however, something unprecedented happened.
From the end of April, the Turks began to train all three regiments of the Division in landing operations. For the experienced officer, this unusual activity left no room for misinterpretation.
"They were preparing something," he said, pointing out that these exercises could not be carried out without an order from the Turkish staff.
According to his assessment, Ankara had made the decision to prepare for a landing long before the July 15 coup against Archbishop Makarios. The Ioannides coup was, according to him, the pretext Turkey needed to implement a plan it had already prepared.
"We're going to have a bad summer"
The most infuriating point of the testimony concerns Athens' stance. Simeoforidis explained that in other periods even a limited movement of a Turkish unit would provoke phone calls and requests for clarification from headquarters.
In 1974, however, despite the unprecedented landing exercises and the constant indications of war preparations, no one contacted him to ask for more information.
He continued his mission as normal, sending what he recorded to Athens. There was a day when he even sent 16 information signals, while under normal circumstances he would send one or two.
At the end of May, his operational chief, with the rank of colonel, arrived in Cyprus from Athens. Simeoforidis believed that the visit would finally lead to measures being taken. Instead, he claimed, the colonel limited himself to a brief tour and prepared to return to Greece without discussing the dangerous situation in detail.
Then the junior officer confronted him head-on.
"When you go to Athens, take precautions. Wake up. We're going to have a bad summer," he told him.
The warning was not heeded.
"He went to Athens. Nothing. Nobody bothered anyone," Simioforidis recalled.
He watched the fleet come
On the afternoon of July 19, according to his account, the Turkish units had completed loading their landing craft. A report was given to the Turkish high command on the personnel, weapons, artillery and other equipment that had been loaded.
Immediately afterwards, the landing force departed from Mersin towards Cyprus.
Simeoforidis and the Kyrenia detachment monitored the convoy's progress, the broadcasts and communications of the Turkish forces. Any available information was transmitted to Athens.
At dawn on July 20, the Turkish ships appeared before him.
The image he described is revealing of the certainty with which the invaders moved. The Turkish soldiers were on the decks without any substantial security measures, as if they did not expect an organized response.
"They didn't care about anything, as if nothing was happening," he said characteristically.
A little later, sporadic gunfire began to be heard. However, there was no organized and coordinated defense that could have stopped the landing.
The landing at Five Mile
The coast at Pente Mile offered, according to Simeoforidis, ideal conditions for the landing. The landing craft approached, opened their catapults and disembarked soldiers, vehicles, guns and tanks without encountering resistance that could have destroyed the bridgehead before it was established.
He was ordered to go near the coast and record what was happening. Due to the distance, he set up an improvised information chain with men positioned every hundred meters. From the roof of a building, with binoculars, he watched and transmitted exactly what the Turks were landing.
"Tanks, cannons, an army, whatever you want. Everything," he said.
Even at that time, while the Turkish army was unloading undisturbed, the questions coming from the operations room did not concern an immediate Greek reaction, but technical details about the position of the ships' waterline.
The officer's anger was such that, as he himself admitted, he erupted against the man who asked for this information. The Turks had already landed troops and heavy weapons and were preparing to move towards Kyrenia. Despite all this, Athens still did not react.
In his estimation, if there had been an artillery squadron and a battalion on the beach, the Turkish landing could have been crushed.
"No Turk would have stepped foot on it. The beach would have been filled with bodies," he said bluntly.
The latest update and captivity
As the Turkish forces advanced and approached his positions, Simeoforidis was forced to withdraw. His last communication was made by the phone of the mayor of Kyrenia.
He was arrested a short time later.
During his captivity, as he testified, the Turks subjected him to torture and deprivation, attempting to extract information from him. He and his companions did not surrender.
"We had a bad time, but we didn't say anything," he stressed.
Eventually, four Greek prisoners were exchanged for ten Turkish officers. Simeophoridis returned and continued to serve, initially in the Alexandroupolis area and then in Constantinople.
"Both incompetence and betrayal"
More than fifty years later, his testimony once again sheds light on the tormenting question of the Cyprus tragedy: How was it possible for there to be so much information, so many warnings and so many obvious indications, without the necessary reaction?
Simeoforidis did not speak with evasiveness. He did not seek easy excuses and did not hide responsibility behind general formulations.
For him, the destruction of Cyprus was the result of both: incompetence and betrayal.
Athens knew. The signals were coming. The Turks were preparing before the eyes of the Greek services. And when the landing fleet appeared in Kyrenia, Cyprus was essentially left alone.
This is the testimony of a man who saw it all firsthand. And that is why it is so weighty. Not only because it describes what the Turks did, but mainly because it reveals what those who had the duty to defend Cyprus did not do.
Watch the video here: https://geopolitico.gr/2026/07/sygklonistiki-martyria-simaioforidi-gia-tin-kypro-enimerona-tin-athina-itan-anikanotita-kai-prodosia/#goog_rewarded
photo https://rodopipress.gr/alexandros-simaioforidis-martyria-kypros-1974-anixneuseis-2026/ – RODOPI PRESS
