The greatest danger to a state is not the enemy in front of it, but the bill that will come after. The Iranian regime, convinced that it could dominate the Middle East and revive its once imperial ambitions, emptied its coffers to achieve this. It created an economic crisis disguised as a military problem. They did not realize that victory meant nothing if the coffers collapsed. They believed that the enemy's army was the greatest threat but in the end it was their own expense for so many years to realize their absurd ambitions. At the end of January 1 euro corresponded to 49.000 Iranian rials, today it corresponds to 1.535.000!. It waged a war capable of destroying the very society it was supposed to defend. It chased glory at the expense of stability. Every decision on the battlefield was, ultimately, a decision about the fiscal solvency of the nation. And if you miscalculate, you don’t just lose soldiers, you lose the state itself. Once again, it proves that leaders who can’t calculate the cost have no business planning strategy. Iran’s leadership squandered wealth on military spending and proxies and bankrupted the nation while winning petty skirmishes. It fought battles that didn’t need to be fought. A protracted conflict of several decades corroded the state faster than the enemy itself.
The gradual de-escalation of the war in Iran marks not the end of a crisis, but the beginning of a deeper geo-economic and geopolitical realignment in the Middle East. Beyond the military operations and developments on the ground, what is taking shape is a new power architecture, in which Iran does not disappear, but transforms from an aggressive regional player into an inward-looking power struggling for its own cohesion.
The vacuum that is created is not left uncovered. On the contrary, three powers – Saudi Arabia, Israel and Turkey – are emerging as the main pillars of the new regional balance. Around them a more complex system of alliances and rivalries is being formed, in which countries such as Egypt, Pakistan and Azerbaijan also participate. The question is no longer who will prevail, but how they will coexist.
The decline of Iranian regional power is now a fact. For decades, Middle Eastern geopolitics was defined by the shadowy conflict between Israel and Iran. Tehran built an extensive network of influence through non-state actors such as Hezbollah and Hamas, extending its presence from Lebanon to Yemen. However, the sequence of events of the last two decades, from the US intervention in Iraq to the war in Syria and the rise of the Houthis, has led to an overextension of Iranian power. The climax came after the Hamas attack in 2023, which provoked an immediate and fierce response from Israel.
The result was twofold: on the one hand, the weakening of Iran's proxy network and on the other, the exposure of its internal weaknesses. Today, it faces economic pressures, social tensions, and centrifugal forces that threaten its cohesion.
In this context, Tehran's priority shifts from exporting power to regime survival.
The new protagonists are Turkey and Saudi Arabia, as the weakening of Iran has created opportunities that both countries are quickly exploiting.
Turkey seeks to establish itself as a leading power in a wide geographical zone extending from the Caspian to the Mediterranean and from the Black Sea to the Arabian Peninsula. Its strategy combines military presence, economic penetration and political influence. Without energy, without trade surpluses, with uncontrolled inflation, with a currency that is constantly devalued, with overextension and an ever-worsening economic situation as its main characteristics, it will make the mistake of moving “the threads of the emergence of its lost empire underground”.
Saudi Arabia, for its part, is trying to maintain its primacy in the Arab world, while adapting to an environment where power is based not only on energy but also on geopolitical flexibility. Despite its reservations about Turkey’s rise, Riyadh is cooperating with Ankara on critical fronts, recognizing that confrontation would be costly. The relationship between the two countries is characterized by a delicate balance between competition for hegemony and cooperation out of necessity.
Israel in a new environment, although it has succeeded in weakening Iran, is faced with a new challenge, the emergence of a more cohesive regional structure, dominated by Sunni states with increasing autonomy.
For the first time in decades, Israel faces not just one main adversary, but a more complex network of forces. Despite its relations with Egypt and Turkey, as well as efforts to normalize with Saudi Arabia, the need for a stable regional balance is becoming more urgent. Of particular concern is the growing influence of Turkey, which combines military power and political ambition.
There is also a role for secondary actors. In addition to the main actors, other countries also play an important role. Egypt is re-emerging as a factor of stability, strengthening its relations with both Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Pakistan is entering the regional equation more actively, especially through defense cooperation.
Of particular interest is Azerbaijan, which uses its geographical position as a bridge between the Caucasus and the Middle East. Its relations with Turkey and Israel allow it to act as a mediator in an environment where interests often clash. Kazakhstan, if it gains access to the seas through Iran, will play a very important role in the entire region as it is already participating in the Abraham Accords. India, of course, sees more than ever the creation of the Indian Silk Road (IMEC- India Meddle East Corridor). The possibility of the Strait of Hormuz being placed under international control is approaching.
China, in addition to cheap Venezuelan oil, will also lose cheap Iranian oil. It will no longer be able to have energy at half the price and export cheap goods and pose a systemic risk to the global economy, threatening to shut down all the world's industries. China's unfair practices in international trade with its trade surpluses are the next challenge for the international community after dealing with the disruptions in the supply chains that Iran has been creating in the wider region for years.
The United States strategy σIn this new landscape, the focus is on a strategic adjustment. Instead of direct and extensive involvement, they seek to rely on allies and partners to manage regional security. The main challenge is to ensure a functional coexistence between the Arab states and Israel. The Palestinian issue remains critical, but attempts are being made to place it in a more controlled and manageable context. The success of this strategy depends on a delicate balance that requires enough influence to guide developments, but enough distance to avoid direct involvement. Η The American strategy of burden-sharing and shifting relies heavily on Turkey and other Arab states to manage security challenges.
A new order of things with opportunities and dangers is emerging. The post-war Middle East will be neither stable nor predictable. The weakening of Iran creates opportunities for new partnerships, but also dangers from the redistribution of power. The new regional order will be characterized by:
- polycentricity instead of unipolar dominance,
- flexible alliances instead of fixed blocs,
- and increased competition for influence.
Iran, although weakened, remains a potential destabilizing factor, especially if its internal developments lead to further instability.
The Middle East is entering a new phase, where the balance of power is not determined by a single axis of conflict, but by a dynamic system of relationships. This development highlights a basic principle of geopolitics where power gaps never remain empty for long but are redistributed. Whether this redistribution will lead to stability or new conflicts will depend on the ability of the main actors to combine competition and cooperation. And in this new landscape, the difference between those who simply react and those who shape developments will determine not only the future of the Middle East, but also the broader global balance. Our country has obviously, in time, perceived the developments.
The strength of a state comes not only from its army but also from its economic resilience, its ability to absorb shocks, recover, and continue to function. Iran was brought to its knees by military budgets, debt burdens, resource dependencies, fragile supply chains, and the long-term costs of projecting power. It failed because it exhausted the capital that keeps it cohesive, confident, and functional. Even victory would be meaningless if the fund collapsed. He did not understand that the leaderships which preservesm the resources They are wiser than those who conquer other states. He did not understand that strength is not measured by how hard you hit, but by how much you can afford to hit.
And history shows that when financial systems collide, it is not the bravest nation that prevails but the most economically disciplined. A lesson for states with similar ambitions like Turkey, which sees its turn coming. Never in history has an empire managed to re-emerge.



























