Aristobulus writes
Three decades have passed since that terrible night of January 30/31, 1996. For us, it will be a night of fleeting memory, where in a looming conflict with Turkey we had great chances of success, but misguided manipulations and chronic pathologies brought the opposite results. It is also a night where the slippery question "what do you want, to wage war with Turkey?" was posed in a torturous manner by an incomplete state to an uneducated society. And of course it is a night whose consequences we are suffering today and will continue to suffer in the future. Because appeasing Turkey has never benefited us, while it serves Turkish aspirations without cost in the field, while Turkey is the one who is really afraid, as we have thoroughly analyzed in another article. The article naturally pays tribute to the heroic crew of the helicopter AB 212 PN 21 that crashed in the Imia area, killing 3 PN officers. Christodoulos Karathanasis, Panagiotis Vlachakos and Hector Gialopsos were not on duty that night on the frigate Navarino. However, since the other crew did not want to fly due to the severe weather conditions (reasonable), they voluntarily went on a suicide mission (heroic). The three of them, unknown people next door, performed their duty to the fullest, remembering the oath of the Greek Soldier and were not the well-paid civil servants as the PN officers are often mockingly called. They will remain immortal in the memory of every Greek-minded patriot. The article will try to demonstrate what happened, what the weaknesses and the consequences were. It will not proceed with a detailed chronological recording of events because these have been recorded many times. And it seeks, by recording the unfavorable turn of events, to constitute a reflection on what has been done since then and what remains to be done and not to constitute a complaint about the bad things…. We will also avoid mentioning names, not out of fear but because that is not the purpose of this article.
The background to this crisis is well known. Since 1974, Turkey has developed its revisionism, seeking to change the status quo in the Aegean, in parallel with its aspirations in Cyprus. There were two other crises, in 1976 and 1987. In these two, many may celebrate the containment of Turkey. In our opinion, they are sadly mistaken, because the events speak for themselves, especially those of 1996. Let us say that since 1994, the UNCLOS on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) has been fully implemented and that the Greek parliament ratified it in 1995, when the threat of war (casus belli) was again raised by the Turkish side. At that time, there was a plan to inhabit many uninhabited small island territories. Citizens within the country and residents abroad had expressed a relative interest, in an attempt to actually implement the provisions of the DDTH. The bad thing is that such a sensitive issue received undue attention and activated Turkish reflexes. The area where the crisis developed is the islets of Imia or Limnia, east of Kalolimnos and near Kalymnos. Their Turkish name is Kardak. These are small island territories with economic activity since the Kalymnian shepherd Antonis Vezyropoulos maintained a herd of goats, so there was economic activity on them, which establishes the status of islands with what this entails in maritime zones, as we have analyzed in a relevant article.
The political situation in the two countries was as follows. It was a coincidence of a lack of government or a government crisis, more elegantly, a parallel life but an application completely opposite in direction, which also determined the swing of the balance. In Greece, the elected prime minister has been ill for a long time and is unable to govern. In the ruling party, associations (Greek factions) have developed for the succession. It is known that the prime minister told his son and later prime minister that he wanted "Akis or Maki", if he could also understand correctly, due to his father's inability to express himself. Simitis, who ultimately prevailed, belonged to an internal party opposition, so the coldness with other ministers of the presidential tendency (e.g. Deputy Prime Minister Papoulias) was a given. So a government that had barely received a vote of confidence from parliament was forced to manage a serious crisis and lead a country that lacked the necessary institutions to deal with such situations (e.g. KYSEA which did not even meet, although outdated for such manipulations). In Turkey, Tansu Çiller was acting prime minister, not only risking her political future but also playing her head against the still powerful military/diplomatic Kemalist establishment at the time. Çiller proved to be a tough negotiator ("we give lives, but we do not give even a pebble"), exhausting all margins and exploiting the slightest detail, as Bülent Ecevit (Cyprus 1974) and Süleyman Demirel (after 1974 and president at that time) had done in the past. It was demonstrated, in contrast to us, that Turkey has the necessary strength and organization in the field and whenever necessary, to benefit even with minimal losses.
The crisis began to develop on December 24, 1995 with the grounding of a cargo ship in western Imia and its (1) first phase lasted until January 23, when its (2) second phase began. The (3) third phase, when it peaked, includes everything that happened from the morning of January 30 onwards, and is what we characterize as the night of the Imias, a night of memory, since it ends in a painful way in the early hours of January 31.
1st phase: Christmas Eve 1995 the Turkish merchant ship Figen Akat runs aground in eastern Imia, when, due to its jurisdiction, the Kalymnos port authority rushes to provide assistance. It is common for ships to run aground due to weather or poor handling, but the day of the event and the immediate refusal of the Turkish captain to accept help because, as he said, it is in Turkish territory raises the first serious suspicion that this was not a completely random event. Or as a random event with a similar background (search for an opportunity to challenge) since the captain proceeded with his denial and since the next day the Turkish Foreign Ministry issued a relevant announcement on sovereignty, which may justify lightning reflexes or reinforce the scenario of seeking an opportunity to challenge Greek sovereign rights and sovereignty as well as measuring our own reaction. However, there is another element that is less known in these 30 years. We all know about the Turkish captain's denial, but according to the then portmaster of Kalymnos who came into contact with him, this did not arise from the mutual understandings between them. However, whether he refused or not, what is the kick-off is the "immediate response" of the Deputy Foreign Minister on sovereignty and with a verbal statement now on December 29, which is a diplomatic document of maximum gravity with all that this implies/means. The issue could either be answered as it was, or not answered. This second view would be a bold action. Not even answering the Turkish statement on the sovereignty status and letting it pass unnoticed as yet another Turkish claim among so many others. And since Figen Akat was detached, everything should continue as before. However, we were afraid that the Turkish claims would be consolidated, so this action of ours to respond is not without correctness. Whichever it was, but with a delay of several days on January 9, 1996. Another proof of the country's reduced reflexes that coincided with the holidays when the priorities were different (leaves, holiday accommodations, 13th salary gift, New Year's Eve, etc.). Of course, not to be leveling, between the sub-ex - sub-am - geeta at the level of competent services and service factors, a sufficient correspondence was developed that showed ways of successfully dealing with the issue that had arisen. However, at the critical time, these were not taken into account and direct political dialogue was preferred since there was no corresponding trust (….).
Phase 2: The entire issue, with the exception of our response on January 9, from December 29 (Turkish verbal communication) to January 23 (Erkaya's phone call to the Turkish embassy in Athens), will not see any further publicity or obvious follow-up. Before we move on to that night, however, we should base our discussion on what Turkish Admiral Erkaya allegedly said regarding Imia. In an intercepted conversation on January 23 (beginning of the 2nd phase) with the Turkish naval attaché in Athens at the Turkish embassy in Athens, he openly mentioned the Turkish possibility of claiming islands held by Greece (Fournoi, Imia, etc.). Then the conversation turned into a crypto format (…). The whole process does not seem very naive to us (…). They probably knew where they were going and ignored us (…) or tested our reflexes (…) or skillfully threw the bait (…). This was a bell for whether we should discuss a few days later whether to place a guard on one or both of the Imia islets. However, at another time he mentioned that there were many other and more suitable points than Imia to ensure the success of the Turkish aspirations and that this particular choice was too risky. From these statements, the conclusion is drawn that the Turks had worked out scenarios to create a crisis and challenge our sovereignty, looking for the right occasion. That is why we argued above that the reaction of the captain of the Figen Akat is strange and certainly the very rapid placement of the deputy commander. The whole activity should have alerted the ASDEN as the competent formation for guarding the islands, but interdisciplinary at the time was an unknown word/concept. Our ships have not yet been deployed in the area and the Turks are escalating covertly and without exposing themselves. After 23 there is a leak to the media of a classified document describing the situation. Another criminal sloppiness that went unpunished. And while the issue may remain low-key, it gains publicity with the corresponding invocation of exclusivity, which whets the appetite for others for similar successes. And this also raises corresponding reflexes from other media outlets, domestic and mainly foreign.
A controversial issue that contributed to the escalation of the crisis before that night is the placement of our own flag by the mayor of Kalymnos in eastern Imia with television coverage when its ownership was questioned. Much has been said and accusations have been made. But let's look at things calmly. Raising a flag on national territory is an action as simple as putting our name on the fence of our plot of land. However, there is also legislation regarding the official placement of flags. So we see that some actions may have different gravity depending on the moment. Oversimplified, we will say that it resembles the case where a bottle of water has a different price at the kiosk and another at the airport, although it remains the same in quantity and quality. The Turks were of course provoked by this. That's right, we have been teaching them to appeasement since 1974. Perhaps it would have been more "flexible" to place flags simultaneously in all the island territories of self-government. Or to place them when the crisis has ended and we have established what is necessary. Because when there is no general coordination and perception and opinion about where we want to get to, a logical action can contribute drastically but certainly not be attributed full responsibility. Let us explain here that the Treaties are clear regarding sovereignty in the region, but the complete registration of the dependent islets from those that are explicitly listed took several decades to be done and the Turks know how to exploit our gaps.
On the Turkish side, Hurriyet, a newspaper with a strong past due to having pioneered the September 1955 uprising, was activated. And it is a medium with historical continuity, while some of ours may be much later. Thus, the television coverage of the placement of the Greek flag in eastern Imia attracted the competition of the Turkish newspaper for a dynamic exclusivity. Except that in the private helicopter with which Hurriyet executives went to eastern Imia and lowered the Greek and raised the Turkish flag, there was also an MIT agent. Another proof that the Turkish deep state had been prepared for a long time, was in coordination with appropriate reflexes and was (simply) waiting for the opportunity (…). Nothing different in core thinking from what they did before 1974 in Cyprus, except that the Turks are good students while we never learn from our mistakes.
Since the issue is now starting to escalate, it is decided that our warship will approach the islet and lower the Turkish flag. In its place, another Greek one was placed, while the deputy's instruction was only to lower the Turkish flag. Miscommunication? Arbitrary initiative? Thus we entered deeper into the trap set for us by the Turks, who were looking to capitalize even more on the opportunity created by the grounding. Whatever it is, it contributed to the escalation, but it is not the main point of the issue. Because it is a pity that you cannot place the flag on your territory as a military unit or official authority. The main point is what you can defend and what you want to do and how much courage and knowledge you have. And an even greater point is as a political power that you want to reach and how willing you are to do the obvious. And also as a military leadership, to inform from peacetime about the problems of the ED and not to let time slip by and suddenly face reality. From our side, it was decided, due to the escalation as the days pass, to man both islets. However, in the process of signing the relevant document, there was a change in the initial proposal and it was chosen to man only the eastern one where the flag was located. At the same time, it was decided that a commando unit that was in Kalymnos with the aim of moving to western Imia, would be installed in Kalolimnos. This whole sequence shows us amateurism, sloppiness and polyphony. Thus, the islet remained unguarded.
Our warships had been given (vaguely) instructions, if required, to launch and then request instructions regarding the next fire. A typical (bad) example of remote crisis management and lack of clarity through specific orders and release of rules of engagement, which the political leadership ignored and as a condition!!! At this point, we should point out that our warships had achieved excellent dispersion, perfect concealment and ensuring complete tactical advantage over the Turkish ones who were in confusion, including the frigate Yavuz (as the leader). The Greek Navy was ready that night to do what its long history and action has endowed it with. Quite simply, in 5 minutes it could finish off 8-10 Turkish warships and have much fewer losses in the same time. It should be taken into account that despite the proximity of the ships, ours had missiles that could be activated at 3nm and not at 10nm that the corresponding Turkish ones needed, with all that this implies for the success of the targeting. And because it was night and the air force would not be flying yet, the party would continue if the Turks brought out more ships. But they would not. And when in the morning the air force could get involved, even if the Turkish had some advantage due to the proximity of airports and numbers, our qualitative superiority would quickly bring things into balance. And on land (Evros & the islands) despite all the weaknesses and deficiencies in personnel and equipment, the forces with an ally in the weather could easily absorb any Turkish energy since they were already dispersed. And as for the possibility of a Turkish landing somewhere, that's for the naive. Landings are not like hiring a taxi to go wherever we want. All of these theories are common sense for those who know the basics of that era. What is certain is that if in 5 minutes the Turks counted 8-10 sunken ships, either the American factor would pressure them to de-escalate or they themselves would ask for a cessation of operations so that they could lick their wounds and see how they could cover the nakedness of the invincibility of the Turkish Armed Forces. It's that simple and for 40 years we would have complete peace and in the Aegean there would be only the vast blue and not blue homelands and Turkish-Libyan memoranda (…).
We will continue with part 2 (from the morning hours of January 30 until the de-escalation and departure of the forces from the islets on January 31)
source photo Greek News fl
source https://geopolitico.gr/
