China has explicitly stated its intention to reshape the international framework to better reflect Chinese economic, political, and security interests. It aims for China’s leadership in deep sea exploration, presence and influence in the Arctic, and dominance in space. It also seeks to promote a new Internet protocol that will facilitate state control of the Internet, as well as the creation and operation of a global financial framework to compete with the United States and the dollar.
To achieve these goals, China has invested systematically, in some cases over decades, mobilizing significant public and private resources, developing specialized human resources, seeking influence in existing international bodies, and, where necessary, creating new institutions. But what is most critical is long-term persistence. China is waiting for the right moment, adjusting its tactics, and capitalizing on every opportunity to move step by step toward fulfilling its plan.
China’s moves in the Arctic are only the most visible aspect of a much broader, structured plan. Since the 1950s, Chinese leaders have been thinking and planning competition around the real and symbolic “frontiers” of global influence, namely the deep seas, the poles, space, and “spheres of power and ideology,” concepts that today also include cyberspace, artificial intelligence, and the international financial framework.
These domains form the critical foundations of global power, so whoever controls these spheres determines access to vital resources, the shape and direction of the internet, the privileges that come with issuing the world’s reserve currency, and, ultimately, the ability to protect against a range of modern security threats.
When the Chinese container ship Istanbul Bridge, carrying 25,000 tonnes of cargo from Ningbo, China, docked at the port of Felixstowe, England, in October 2025, the ship completed the first large-scale commercial voyage connecting China with Europe via the Northern Sea Route in the Arctic in just 20 days, sending a clear operational and symbolic message about Chinese ambitions in the Arctic. The journey time compares to the 25 days required by rail via the China–Europe Railway Express, 40 days via the Suez Canal and around 50 days via the Cape of Good Hope.
The incident is part of China’s strategic line that includes promoting the “Polar Silk Road”, investing in infrastructure, diplomatic penetration in polar forums and the development of dual-use technologies to transform the Arctic and the “frontiers” of the international order in general, into new bases of power. The 2018 Chinese white paper on the Arctic puts it very clearly: Beijing seeks to “participate in and contribute” to the development of the corridors and resources of the region even though it is not part of the Arctic countries. The 8 Arctic countries are: the United States, Canada, Iceland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland and Russia which participate in the Arctic Council.
The deep seabed: China has established at least a dozen research centers dedicated to studying the deep ocean and has built the world’s largest fleet of civilian research vessels. The ocean holds unexplored and valuable resources, and in order to tap them, it has planned to master the critical technologies for accessing, mapping, and exploiting the seabed. There are no roads carved into the deep ocean, so it doesn’t need permission from other countries to pass through; it wants China to be the one to carve and control the seabed roads. Chinese companies have already secured five seabed exploration contracts from the International Seabed Authority (ISA), the most of any country. According to a Carnegie Endowment report, in 2023 China tried to block the ISA from discussing the protection of marine ecosystems and to place a precautionary freeze on deep-sea mining licenses. China has the technology to reach the deep sea, so it is rushing to mine, and could have a head start on mining in Greenland.
The Arctic: Like the seabed, the Arctic is rich in natural resources. It is estimated to contain about 13% of the world's undiscovered oil reserves, 30% of its undiscovered natural gas, and significant reserves of rare earths. China wants to play a greater role in decision-making in the Arctic, arguing that climate change is turning the region into a global commons and that because Chinese companies are critical to shipping and energy, it should have a say in what happens in the Arctic, even if it does not border the Arctic.
While many democratic countries have closed their doors to new Chinese investment in the Arctic, Russia has chosen to open its own. Since 2018, China and Russia have institutionalized channels of consultation on Arctic issues, and their cooperation has been significantly strengthened since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, when Russia found itself diplomatically and economically isolated from many Arctic Council member states. Since then, Chinese companies have signed agreements for projects such as titanium and lithium mines, the construction of new rail infrastructure, and the establishment of deep-sea and dual-use ports. Overall, China and Russia’s combined capabilities in exploration, trade, and presence in the Arctic now significantly exceed those of the United States.
At the same time, China has used its cooperation with Russia to expand its military reach in the region. Since 2022, the two countries have held a series of joint exercises, including in the Bering Sea and the Chukchi Sea, as well as joint bomber patrols near Alaska. In addition, China and Russia have promoted the inclusion of BRICS in the sphere of Arctic discussions, establishing a working group on ocean and polar science and technology and considering the development of an international scientific station in the Svalbard archipelago.
The Sino-Russian relationship in the Arctic has its limits. Although their cooperation is presented as very close, Russia has not openly supported China’s claim to expand its role in Arctic governance. The joint exercises still contain strong elements of demonstration and symbolism. In 2020, the Russian envoy to the Arctic Council agreed with the US secretary of state, classifying China as a non-Arctic power and questioning the “authenticity” of a Chinese Arctic participation. At the same time, Russia initiated legal proceedings against a Russian professor who allegedly provided China with classified material on submarine detection methods, which shows the sensitivity and limits of trust in bilateral Russian-Chinese cooperation. But now that Russia’s dependence on China is constantly growing, China will constantly pressure Russia to back down.
But what does all this mean in practice for Greenland? And how realistic is the scenario that China will "take" the island, whether economically, politically, or in some other way?
Greenland is a strategic region as it has a geographical location in the center of the Arctic, lacks population weight but has important raw materials (rare earths, nickel, platinum, lithium in various deposits) and open shipping possibilities as the ice melts. For countries seeking to secure critical metals and gain naval access to the North Atlantic, Greenland has enormous value. Countries like China know this and invest accordingly without revealing their strategy, but with targeted economic and diplomatic steps.
His journey Istanbul Bridge confirmed that the Northern Sea Route can function, in times of reduced ice, as an island of speed and cost for shipping. However, capacity, seasonality and environmental risk make the route complementary and not at the same time capable of fully replacing the Suez or the Cape of Good Hope round. The exploitation of the route depends on Russian cooperation/infrastructure, icebreaker support, and the fragility of the ecosystem.
Η China in Greenland: There are three realistic avenues by which China can increase its influence in Greenland:
- Financial investments and mining contracts: Chinese state-owned companies have the deepwater and rare earth mining expertise, so they can finance projects, provide equipment, and acquire mining rights. This creates dependency and political influence, but is subject to local regulations, environmental pressure, and political legitimization from Denmark/Greenland.
- Diplomatic and technical penetration: through research programs, cooperation in education, funding of infrastructure and technological partnerships (e.g. telecommunications networks, licensing). This is the “soft power” that translates into political capital.
- Geostrategic cooperation: in the event of major international unrest, the presence of dual-use naval or research vessels could increase pressure. But this requires risky moves that would provoke an immediate reaction from Denmark, NATO and the US.
Therefore, the scenario for China is not a “purchase” or “occupation” of Greenland, but a gradual, legal but politically aggressive infiltration that creates dependencies in economic terms on the local society and the supply chain of critical metals.
China’s global leadership in rare earth mining and processing (85%) makes it a potential future mining partner for Greenland. Greenland’s Minister of Enterprise and Mineral Resources has warned that while Western partnerships are preferred, investment is still lacking, so Greenland may be forced to turn to other partners, including China. Already, Chinese rare earth company Shenghe Resources is the second largest shareholder in the Kvanefjeld mine. Shenghe signed a memorandum of understanding in 2018 to lead the processing and marketing of materials extracted from the site. Greenland's two rare earth deposits, which are among the largest in the world, ranking it eighth in the world in terms of rare earth reserves, with 1,5 million tons, are Kvanefjeld (in addition to rare earths, it also contains 270.000 tons of uranium) and Tanbreez (in addition to rare earths, it also contains thallium, niobium and zirconium). However, to date, no rare earth mining has taken place in Greenland. Only the White Mountain anorthosite mine and the small but high-quality Nalunaq gold mine are in operation. A total of 147 mining permits have been granted throughout Greenland.
China has long sought to establish economic and technical arms in Greenland through infrastructure projects, but the efforts have not borne fruit, mainly due to political and geostrategic objections. Over the past decade, there have been proposals for investments in airports, an abandoned naval station, and a ground-based satellite hub, but these initiatives were ultimately blocked or suspended under pressure and restrictions from the United States and Denmark.
The US has actively sought to stop the expansion of Chinese control over Greenland's rare earth supplies. As a result, US authorities pressured the investor in Tanbreez not to sell the deposit to a Chinese company, and Tanbreez was eventually given to Critical Metals Corp of New York. Tanbreez is estimated to contain a deposit of global significance, possibly the largest in the world, with 28,2 million metric tons.
China has expressed a clear interest in financing and upgrading Greenland’s infrastructure, both to support potential mining investments and to advance its Arctic ambitions. However, no major projects have been completed to date. In 2018, state-owned China Communications Construction was shortlisted to build and expand a network of airports in Nuuk, Ilulissat and Qaqortoq, in a project estimated to cost close to $550 million, about 17% of Greenland’s GDP ($3,3 billion in 2024). The proposal raised concerns in both the US and Denmark. The US intervened to thwart China’s plans.
Environmental dimension: The exploitation of resources in the Arctic and deep sea raises serious environmental issues. At the international level, the fight for rules is ongoing, in the International Seabed Authority and other forums. China has shown an active effort to shape standards in favor of its own industrial path, with the consequences of not protecting ecosystems. For example, the confrontation in the ISA over early mining licensing reveals the gap between development and environmental protection.
China won't "take" Greenland easily. The real danger is the gradual, legal and financially controlled influence that creates structural links of dependency, both in local communities and in the global chain of critical materials. The antidote is not isolationism or a “market of competing interests” but a smart combination of transparency, investment, environmental control and a strong multilateral presence that will give the people of Greenland the opportunity to choose with knowledge and sovereignty. In the 21st century, the fight for new frontiers (Arctic, deep sea, space, cyberspace, etc.) will be judged more by legal-institutional, technological and economic choices than by simple territorial claims. Europe together with its allies still has the opportunity to set the terms of this game.
The Tanbreez mine holds a large reservoir of heavy rare earths, which could eventually reduce the US and EU’s dependence on China’s monopoly supply of these critical metals. However, before investments in these deposits can be economically viable and provide security benefits for both the US and Greenland, extensive improvements in supporting infrastructure and broader social acceptance of mining are necessary. Given the enormous investment needs for infrastructure and the development of the mining ecosystem in Greenland, the US needs to adopt a coordinated policy with its allies, while recognizing that it is not the only stakeholder or the only country seeking access to Greenland’s minerals. In June 2025, the EU designated the Amitsoq graphite project (for batteries and defense applications) in Greenland as a Strategic Project as China has controlled 79% of global graphite production.
China’s monopoly on rare earths, combined with its willingness to weaponize export controls as a means of pressure, necessitates a coordinated US-EU strategic dialogue to create reliable alternative supplies and support new projects through joint procurement agreements, financial support and political support. Otherwise, the US, but even more so the EU, risks not having the critical materials and rare earths necessary to develop artificial intelligence, unmanned vehicles, humanoid robots, high-tech defense equipment, drones, etc. In addition, they will be blackmailed in many other areas by the bans that China has already imposed on rare earth exports.
The possibility of financing investments in Greenland was established in 2019 through the European Energy and Security Act, which gave the DFC (US Agency for International Development Finance) the authority to support specific energy projects in eligible European countries, including Greenland.
Greenland should include as a condition of licensing agreements that benefit communities, which commit operators to prefer local labor, fund training and apprenticeship programs, set procurement quotas for local small and medium-sized enterprises, and regularly publish progress reports on the fulfillment of their obligations.
The United States has a significant opportunity to deepen strategic ties with Greenland, not through direct purchase or military intervention, but through coordinated investment with the EU. Otherwise, China is lurking.
photo https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-46386867 – BBC News
