By Kostas Grivas
The more fundamental question is not simply whether the US sought to stop Iran's nuclear program. It is whether that was indeed its central and exclusive goal. The attack and dismantling of diplomacy seems like the beginning of a new American doctrine of the application of military power, reminiscent of a street fighter.
Negotiations were underway when the American-Israeli attack occurred. It had not become clear that the diplomatic path had been exhausted, nor that the Iran it could not, under pressure and in return, accept a strict regime of surveillance and restrictions. If the final and irreversible cessation of the nuclear program was indeed the goal, then one would expect a different strategy and not street fighter behavior.
In a broader geopolitical context, it is surprising that no coordinated strategy to encircle Iran was attempted – at least visibly – by the other nuclear powers, mainly Russia and China. The simplistic view is often adopted that Moscow and Beijing are allies of Tehran and would therefore support it unconditionally. Such an approach, however, ignores the complexity of international relations and the logic of the nuclear oligopoly.
The US, Russia and China form the core of the global nuclear hierarchy. Their power is not only quantitative, but also institutional-normative. A nuclear Iran would pose a serious risk of nuclear inflation. Saudi Arabia, which for decades has acquired high-performance ballistic missiles from China and maintains close relations with Pakistan, would be under intense pressure to acquire a nuclear capability.
Turkey is anxiously awaiting this opportunity, while Egypt and possibly other regional powers would reconsider their strategic choices. In Asia, Japan and South Korea could move in a similar direction. Such a scenario serves neither long-term Chinese interests nor Russia’s strategic self-perception as a nuclear superpower.
An inflationary nuclear system would diminish the exclusivity of their power and, in the case of China, dramatically reduce their ability to implement regional hegemony. In the case of Russia, it is very likely that it would trigger thoughts of nuclearizing Europe, depriving Moscow of a decisive factor in exerting pressure on Western Europe.
USA: From boxer to street fighter
Under this logic, an informal coalition of the major nuclear powers could have been formed with the aim of exerting combined pressure on Iran. On the one hand, we would have offered security guarantees and economic rewards, and on the other, clear and credible threats of consequences. Such an approach would have allowed Tehran to consent without appearing defeated, while at the same time strengthening the international legitimacy of possible stricter action in the event of refusal. However, such a strategy does not seem to have been seriously attempted.
This fact allows us to assume that the American targeting may have gone beyond the problem of the Iranian nuclear program itself. We may be facing a broader shift in the philosophy of using American military power. A transition from the model of normative hegemony—where power is supposed to be exercised within a framework of institutions, protocols, and predictability—to a model of more unpredictable and unfettered power.
The simultaneous conduct of negotiations and military actions, the targeting of leaderships in the midst of diplomatic processes and the demolition of unwritten rules create the image of a power that does not limit itself. From a “boxer” that fights by specific rules, the superpower appears like a street fighter that uses any means, even dirty ones. Unpredictable behavior can indeed function as a multiplier: It increases the cost of strategic planning of the opponent and enhances psychological pressure.
However, this strategy has serious side effects. Historically, US power has not only been based on its military superiority, but also on its credibility as a pillar of an international regulatory framework. The dismantling of the diplomatic tradition – in this case the principle of not harming the adversary while negotiating with him – erodes trust. In a nuclear environment, trust is not a moral category, it is a mechanism of stability.
The risk of unpredictable power
Η experience of attacking the Gaddafi regime in Libya in the past, already served as a negative precedent. Libya had abandoned its weapons of mass destruction program to rejoin the international community, but it collapsed after Western military intervention. In contrast, North Korea, having acquired nuclear weapons, avoided a similar fate. The message received by many international actors, including Iran, was clear: Nuclear deterrence is a guarantee of survival. Whether this reading is entirely accurate or not, the perception carries strategic weight.
Credibility in international relations has two aspects. It is the credibility of threat and the credibility of commitment. When the former is overly strengthened, the latter can be undermined. If actors in the international system conclude that rules can be suspended at will, then every negotiation becomes a game of trap. In a world with nuclear weapons, increased suspicion implies smaller margins of decision and a higher risk of misinterpretation.
The problem, therefore, is not just Iranian. It is systemic. If the international order shifts from a normative hegemony to a regime of unpredictable power, then liquidity increases and with it risk. Rules are not just romantic relics of a past, they are tools for risk management. Even the powerful have an interest in operating within a predictable framework.
The crucial question is whether the current US posture represents a temporary tactical adjustment or a deeper shift in strategic culture. If the latter, then we are entering a period of heightened instability. Deregulation may offer short-term advantages, but in the long term it may erode the very foundation of American hegemony.
In a world where nuclear weapons coexist with the erosion of protocols, the need to reaffirm rules is not a moral luxury, but a strategic necessity. The challenge is not simply to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, but to preserve an international order where power coexists with predictability. For when the game of power ceases to be governed by rules, risk is not distributed evenly, it is spread out unchecked. And in a nuclear system, the spread of risk out of control is the most dangerous scenario of all.
Source https://slpress.gr/amyna/pos-oi-ipa-metatrepontai-apo-boxer-se-street-fighter/
Photo TheDigitalArtist, https://pixabay.com
