Of Gregory R. Copley, Publisher of Defense & Foreign Affairs
Turkey should now be considered a nuclear weapons state or, at least, a state in the early stages of acquiring nuclear weapons.
It is now apparent that the Turkish defense establishment has created small-sized nuclear weapons, suitable for short- or medium-range delivery via artillery, missiles, or aircraft for regional use, in addition to the capability it has now developed for intercontinental delivery of nuclear weapons.
This changes the regional defense equation, placing Turkey—according to its own interpretation—at a degree of parity with its regional competitor, Israel, and at a significant advantage over Greece and Western Europe, as well as Russia.
Ankara may well be reluctant, for political reasons, to absolutely confirm its military nuclear capability. Instead, by hinting at it, Ankara would maintain the same ambiguity that Israel and Iran have maintained about their own nuclear offensive capabilities.
Preparations for this situation have been underway in Turkey for at least 30 years in a serious manner and were definitively reported by the Defense & Foreign Affairs Special Analysis on July 23, 2010, in the exhibition entitled "Turkey is now escalating its moves towards acquiring nuclear weapons", which referred to previous Defense & Foreign Affairs reports about work toward a Turkish nuclear capability.
The revelation of the operational readiness of a new Turkish intercontinental ballistic missile, the Yildirimhan, with a range of over 6.000 km —3.728 miles and above— should be considered the final indication that the capability to manufacture a nuclear weapon or nuclear warhead has already been achieved and, indeed, that the parameters of miniaturizing the weapon and adapting it to the new intercontinental ballistic missile have already been achieved.
Ο Yildirimhan developed by the Research and Development Center of the Ministry of National Defense of Turkey and presented for the first time at the defense and aerospace exhibition SAHA Expo 2026 in Istanbul, on May 5, 2026.
The single-stage rocket uses liquid nitrogen tetroxide as fuel for its four engines and is reportedly capable of reaching speeds between Mach 9 and Mach 25.
There has been no confirmation of the completion of a test flight program, but the missile has been under development for about 10 years, according to sources in the Turkish Ministry of Defense.
Turkey has been committed in recent years to developing hypersonic and ballistic systems of greater capability than, for example, the short-range ballistic missile system. Typhoon. The ballistic missile Tayfun Block IV of Turkey is capable of reaching speeds of over Mach 5, with a range of 800 km, and conducted successful tests in the last week of April and the first week of May 2026. Turkey had already indicated that it planned to mass produce this missile by 2026.
The English-language Ukrainian online edition Defense Express reported on May 6, 2026 that the new intercontinental ballistic missile Yildirimhan could be an "early indication" that Turkey was preparing to develop nuclear weapons.
This is a misreading of the situation.
The unveiling of the intercontinental ballistic missile was an indication that the Turkish military nuclear program had already reached the weapons-grade stage.
The initial report that the road transport Yildirimhan could "reach Beijing" was an understatement. A reduction in the payload could allow the ICBM to achieve a greater range than that. However, the initially stated warhead mass was given to the 3.000 Kg. —6.600 pounds.
The transport of a conventional warhead with such an expensive and strategic delivery system as the Yildirimhan would be militarily counterproductive: delivering a small payload to a strategic target—provoking a total strategic response, namely nuclear—would be tantamount to carrying a knife to start what would inevitably escalate into a gunfight.
However, it should be noted that the Turkish government has also considered the transport of chemical and/or biological payloads via intercontinental ballistic missiles, in light of known Turkish research into such weapons since at least 1974.
At a basic level, however, it must be assumed that the system would use multiple independently targeted re-entry warheads —MIRV— probably at least three in each load. Again, there is no evidence that Turkey has yet tested its MIRV capabilities, but, as with nuclear weapons, computer simulations can provide much of the verification without the need for physical testing.
The Defense Express noted:
"For comparison, the American intercontinental ballistic missile Minuteman III carries the nuclear warhead W87, with a power of 300 kilotons and a weight of only 180 to 270 kilograms. The Yildirimhan It could therefore carry several such warheads simultaneously along with a transport vehicle, with a significant mass margin that could extend the missile's maximum range by several thousand additional kilometers."
Ankara has long been concerned not only about Israeli nuclear advantage, but also about Iran's nuclear weapons program—and, indeed, capability—but has been forced to maintain high secrecy around Turkish nuclear developments, for fear of alienating its NATO partners and, indeed, Russia.
It is possible—even likely—that, despite the new missile's obviously military name, the Turkish government will present the Yildirimhan as a space launch vehicle, in order to strengthen the country's space program.
The missile was reportedly named after the Ottoman sultan Bayezid I —1389-1402—, known as Yildirim, meaning "lightning", due to its speed and military power.
The question remains as to which countries provided technical support to Turkey’s nuclear program. Clearly, the twin impetus for the Turkish nuclear weapons program was the nuclear capabilities of Israel and Iran, although Ankara has long presented Turkey’s ambition as a regional great power, at least on par with the United Kingdom in Europe.
But it can be concluded that the only powers that would probably be interested in helping Turkey with a nuclear weapons program would be the Pakistan and Ukraine.
Pakistan, as noted in the July 23, 2010 report in Defense & Foreign Affairs, had already offered its support to Turkey in developing such a nuclear capability.
The People's Republic of China may well have been concerned about a Turkish nuclear weapons program, given the reality that Turkey was not necessarily a stable ally for Beijing. This, therefore, could have precluded support from North Korea.
If evidence emerged pointing to Ukraine as a source of support for the Turkish nuclear program, this could potentially further alienate the Ukrainian government from continued military support from the United States and, indeed, several European states.
Ukraine, as a potential source of nuclear technology and material support, must, however, be seriously considered, given the fact that Ukraine had been heavily involved, after the collapse of the USSR, in the trade of complete nuclear weapons and components to Iran—and perhaps other states—as part of the criminal exploitation of the remnants of Soviet nuclear stockpiles.
Ukraine would also be a desirable source for Turkey when it comes to missile system-related skills.
One of the important aspects of Yildirimhan is that its liquid-fuel system shows that Turkey has not yet developed a solid-fuel capability, such as that used for decades in the intercontinental ballistic missile programs of major powers.
The liquid fuel requirement means that the Yildirimhan it would need to be refueled shortly before launch, meaning the time from launch order to launch would be delayed compared to opposing forces.
Turkey has made strides in a number of important advanced weapons systems for land, naval and air force missions, and has penetrated foreign defense markets in 2026.
Its new manned fighter aircraft, supposedly fifth-generation or more KAAN, has attracted strong interest from Spain, Saudi Arabia and Indonesia. But this project also benefited from significant technological input: the overall system is supported by the United Kingdom, while the initial power unit is provided by General Electric of the USA —engines F110-GE-129—, to be later replaced by Turkish engines.
All of this has happened while the Turkish economy is in dire straits, with serious hardships for the Turkish population. However, defense and aerospace projects have generated foreign currency sales and international prestige, all of which reflect positively on the under-pressure presidency of Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
Source https://www.anixneuseis.gr/
Photo Babelphotography, https://pixabay.com
