Greenland is at the center of a new strategic realignment, and the question arises as to what the US “demand” really means and what are the implications for Europe, NATO and the Greenlanders themselves? The recent episode is part of a broader geostrategic pattern: the Arctic is no longer a marginal theater and is becoming a critical field of control for supply lines, technological infrastructure and military presence. The US sees Greenland not simply as a repository of raw materials, but as a “switch” of strategic value that ensures access, surveillance and defense over the North Atlantic and Arctic corridors.
Historical context and technical rationale. During the Cold War, the critical geographic point was the GIUK Gap, the sea passage between Greenland, Iceland, and the United Kingdom through which Soviet submarines could enter the Atlantic. It was the only passage through which Soviet submarines could enter the Atlantic. In a conflict scenario, the Soviet Union would seek to occupy Iceland and Greenland, along with attacks on British bases conducting anti-submarine operations so that it could enter the Atlantic. Defense and surveillance of this corridor (e.g. through systems such as SURTASS that detected the sounds of enemy submarines) was a key factor in saving the US–Europe supply lines. If the US did not detect the submarines, they could endanger the supply lines to Europe, which is why the US in World War II essentially "occupied" Greenland so that it would not fall into the hands of Germany and cut off supplies to Europe.
Today the technical challenge is evolving as the modern transpolar capabilities of Russia and China (China has the most advanced deep-sea technology) and the climate transformation that opens up new sea lanes, make Greenland an “auditory and an eye” in which one can install sensors, radars and counter-threat infrastructure. This is the core of the American argument for the “strategic role” of Greenland. Russia is cooperating with China to prevent the US from controlling the Arctic, to which Greenland belongs by 2/3. The revival of the Russian empire with military invasions is already being relived by humanity. China, since the conquest of Tibet and Xinjiang, is preparing to soon conquer Taiwan.
Resources or security platform? Public debate often focuses on the economic importance of rare earths and undersea deposits, that is, the economic benefits that will accrue to whoever controls Greenland. But Greenland’s value is not limited to mining but to security, which has invaluable economic value: from there, systems can be developed that monitor the Arctic, support air and naval defenses, and, crucially, eliminate the ability of an adversary to use the Arctic as a corridor for projecting power into the Western Hemisphere. The distinction between Greenland’s “productive value” and “strategic value” is crucial to understanding the motivations. Today, a new security issue has emerged that involves the wider Atlantic and Greenland in particular: the use of the Arctic as a route for Russian and Chinese attacks on North America. Greenland has now become an important base from which to thwart air attacks and naval threats. Russia and China are developing interpolar systems, so the US is forced to create sensors and weapons to repel them. In practice, this means a secure checkpoint that would not fall into the hands of enemy forces and therefore could not function as a platform for projecting power by enemies. The US has already exerted enormous pressure on Denmark to prevent the multiple attempts by the Chinese to obtain mining and infrastructure contracts (ports, roads, etc.) in Greenland.
Before engaging in direct military confrontation, one must first secure one’s “backbone”: guarantee the reliability of one’s energy supply, protect vital trade routes, and prevent neighbors from providing an adversary with strategic depth. For the United States, the case of Venezuela fits into this logic of supply chain security, as well as Greenland. If tensions with China escalate, its vast oil reserves must not be turned into an energy “lifeline” for Beijing. The central design is economic containment to prevent China from gaining independent access to critical resources and corridors. When economic pressure fails, military power is intended to act as a last resort. China, with its huge trade surpluses that reached $1,2 trillion, is creating serious problems in the global economy and in countries with trade deficits, because they are due to unfair practices such as artificial devaluation of the yuan, state subsidies, and sales below cost to neutralize its global competitors (in 2024, both the EU and the US had a trade deficit with China of almost $300 billion each).
Interconnection with NATO and European concerns. The US demand that Denmark cede practical territory (or broader control) raises fundamental questions about the nature of collective security. NATO was founded to protect Europe and North America as a single entity; the transfer of sovereign rights of a European state to a third power tests the limits of allied trust. From a European perspective, the prospect of an ally “losing” a substantial piece of territory to an allied entity also undermines NATO’s political legitimacy. If the alliance can be used as a tool for diplomatic redistribution of territorial interests, then European autonomy and security are put under new, pressing questions. NATO’s foundation is the US commitment to European security. The possibility that Trump might seek to change the alliance to be responsible for providing aid to America itself in the event of war reverses the traditional dynamic and would be seen by Europe as an unexpected and unwelcome development. Of course, pushing the Chinese and Russians out of Greenland also secures Europe.
The question of sovereignty and the Greenlanders. Beyond Denmark and the US, there is Greenland’s actual population and internal self-governance policies in the equation. The discussion of “handing over” or “leasing” territory cannot ignore the right to self-determination, the environmental risks, and the socio-economic impacts on communities already experiencing the consequences of climate change. From an ethical and political perspective, the attempt to “change ownership” in areas with indigenous populations meets with strong resistance, even when national security arguments are raised.
Possible risks and contradictions. Turning Greenland into a tangible defense tool has its pitfalls: the militarization of a sensitive ecosystem, the climate and technological impact, the risk of escalating regional tensions, and the creation of legal and political precedents that undermine international order. Also, the attempt to “acquire” territory for preventive control may legitimize similar claims by other great powers — leading to a vicious cycle of competition in the Arctic.
Alternative perspectives and policy proposals. There are multiple, compatible approaches: (a) The American one: it is considered imperative to secure strategic positions in order to prevent a “closed” environment for supply lines and deterrence of attacks (b) The Danish/European one: underlines the need to respect sovereignty, collective management within NATO and to strengthen the European contribution to Arctic defense (c) The local/Greenlandic one: advocates autonomy, sustainable development and participation rights in decisions concerning the environment and society. A compromise policy could foresee enhanced military and technical cooperation under multiple guarantees: international surveillance, conditions for limited use of infrastructure, commitments to environmental protection and concrete benefits for the local economy.
Conclusion — the double dilemma. Greenland is both an economic resource and a defense: its strategic importance goes beyond visible flows of wealth. The challenge for Europe and Denmark is to combine respect for sovereignty and autonomy with the need for collective security in the face of new technological and geopolitical challenges in the Arctic. For the US, the strategic imperative is understandable, but the tactic of “claiming territory” creates political costs and legal-diplomatic rifts. Ultimately, the best solution is not unilateral conquest, but multilateral, institutional cooperation that will guarantee both defense adequacy and sovereignty, sustainable development and the rights of the inhabitants of Greenland.
The US power is not only its military might but also the international networks of cooperation and the collective security structures it has built with its allies. In this way, it distributes the ability to respond to multiple partners through a form of “distributed power”. China and Russia, by contrast, develop clientelistic relationships with trade-offs and subservience, which weakens the viability and credibility of their alliances. The US should not abandon the successful and familiar logic that maritime powers thrive through networks, partnerships and voluntary cooperation, while continental empires succeed through conquest, occupation and coercive control. Overexpansion by occupying territory is not only financially burdensome, but it also ties up critical resources in occupation missions, weakening your capabilities in other areas and creating strategic gaps that opponents can exploit. It also creates diplomatic isolation and backlash. Will a wise solution prevail?
Photo By USAF – Source: Air Force Weather (image), Public Domain, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=1422544 - https://el.wikipedia.org/wiki/
