Athanasios Platias writes
The latest episode At Case it was a classic application of "gunboat diplomacy", where Turkey, demonstrating its naval power, effectively canceled the Greek-Egypt EEZ delimitation agreement.
Turkey's strategy is summarized as follows: for Greece to take any action beyond its territorial waters in "disputed areas" Ankara's consent is needed.
This increases the "geopolitical risk" even if we are going to sink a cable in the Greek continental shelf/ EEZ.
What happened in Kasos follows Turkey's opposition to the creation of wind farms around Milos.
These two incidents show that Turkey is trying to impose co-management in practice in the Aegean. Where this will lead is not difficult to imagine, since Turkey has raised the issue of sovereignty over a number of inhabited islands and islets, such as Oinousses, Fourni, Lipsoi, Gavdos.
Turkey is imposing its will through the threat of escalation. In Kasos, the Greek attempt to exercise sovereign rights stumbled upon the Turkish fleet that surrounded the Italian research vessel. Thus, Athens was once again faced with the dilemma known from the Imias: retreat or confrontation.
The possibility of escalation no longer seems to scare the Turkish leadership, because it feels it can control every next step on the escalation ladder. So the conclusion that Ankara seems to have reached is that Athens, due to weakness, no longer has "red lines" and thus can act with impunity. In other words, the Greek deterrence has collapsed.
How does Athens react? Attempts to manage negative impressions with communicative narratives.
Sometimes this is beyond imagination, since a few years ago we heard that we are not interested in the mineral wealth of the Eastern Mediterranean because of the "green transition" to alternative energy sources.
What is not enough, the fox makes hangers! No one bothered to inform the propagandists that even after 2050 the use of fossil fuels will continue to increase in absolute terms due to demand, even if their share of the global energy mix will decrease.
How should Athens have reacted? To have tried to restore its deterrent capacity. Strengthening, for example, its Navy, which has been neglected beyond all strategic logic.
MEKO frigates and submarines could have been modernized long ago. Corvettes and one more French frigate could have been ordered. None of this has been done with the consequence that precious time has been lost that cannot be recovered.
Modern weapon systems are not bought off the shelf, but take at least five years to acquire. US frigates for example, which have recently shown interest, have delivery dates of more than a decade.
Has anyone wondered what will happen until then?
One could object that I am underestimating the high morale of the Greek people and the Armed Forces.
A basic axiom of the strategy is that morality can work wonders in the short term, but in the long term matter dictates its logic.
Unfortunately, the demographic, economic, military and technological trends in the balance of power with Turkey are disheartening.
I am not at all sure that the Greek political leadership – and I am not referring only to the government – has realized the strategic implications of these trends: in a few years, if we do not react immediately, there will be no other choice than to make the country a satellite of Turkey.
