By Panagiotis Garzonikas
The terrorist attack by Hamas against Israel brought strategic surprise back to the fore. And indeed in an impressive way, because it coincided after 50 years with the surprise suffered by Israel in 1973, with the simultaneous attack of Egypt and Syria. The latest attack created a huge sensation worldwide because Israel's intelligence services were considered among the best.
According to expert Richard Betts, "strategic surprise occurs to the extent that the victim does not realize if, when, where, or how the adversary will attack". The pre-emptive attack, which aims by the use of surprise to secure a significant initial advantage, is essentially identical with strategic surprise. After all, most modern wars begin with a pre-emptive attack, without being declared. However, surprise applies not only at the strategic level, but also at the operational and tactical levels. It is no accident that surprise is included in the principles of war of all Western armies.
Surprise allows the side that achieves it to amass unnoticed superior forces at the decisive point and catch the opponent off guard in terms of time, place, method, or new technologies. Surprise allows a large percentage of enemy capabilities to be destroyed at low cost or at a slower speed, thus acting as a power multiplier. Sometimes, surprise provides the weaker side with the only hope of compensating for its weaknesses and the only opportunity to overcome a stronger opponent. For surprise to succeed, secrecy is necessary, as well as extensive deception.
Another major scholar of the subject, Michael Handel, observed that while surprise has always been possible at the tactical level, its applicability at the strategic level is a 20th-century phenomenon. Clausewitz, writing in the early 19th century, believed that surprise could rarely be highly successful. "Therefore, it would be a mistake to regard surprise as an essential element of success in war”.
New strategic view
By the turn of the 20th century, the increased agility, speed, and range achieved by the introduction of railroads, motorization, and especially aviation and ballistic missiles have made it possible to achieve surprise at the strategic level as well. Strategic surprise has not only become possible, but has also become very difficult to prevent, despite the significant improvement in intelligence capabilities.
This is demonstrated by the following cases: the German invasion of the Soviet Union (1941), the Japanese invasion of Pearl Harbor (1941), the North's invasion of South Korea (1950), the joint British-French-Israeli attack on Egypt (1956) , the Israeli pre-emptive strike against Egypt that started the Six Day War (1967), the Egyptian-Syrian attack on Israel (1973), the seizure of the Falklands by Argentina (1982), the annexation of Kuwait by Iraq (1990) , and the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001.
While the effects of surprise can be overwhelming early in the conflict, surprise rarely proves decisive. As Handel notes, "there is no positive correlation between the initial success of strategic surprise and the outcome of the war". Two examples, with up to a point positive effects on the outcome of the war, are the destruction of the Egyptian air force on the ground in the Six Day War and the outcome of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war.
In the first case, the destruction of the Egyptian air force significantly affected the conduct and outcome of the war. However, in the long run, the proud military victory did not solve the political problem, and Israel is still called upon to manage the issue of the territories occupied since 1967. In the second case, Egypt which started the war, rather suffered a military defeat. Despite this, it managed to take back the Sinai, albeit with limitations, relinquishing its leadership position in the Arab world.
The problem of information
The fact that a country is caught by surprise is not due to a lack of information but to the weaknesses and limitations of the information cycle. In summary, some of the explanations that have been given for these weaknesses:
- Signals and parasites. The information collected by an intelligence service is divided into correct (signals) and incorrect (parasites). Although categorization has theoretical value, in practice it is very difficult to distinguish signals from noise.
- Deception. Sophisticated deception operations usually precede surprise, intended to conceal the preparations, direction and timing of the attack.
- Correct perceptions and misconceptions. The objective and accurate assessment of information is made extremely difficult by the biases of those who interpret it, such as wishful thinking, the degree of knowledge of the adversary, the projection of their own culture, ideological beliefs, military doctrine, and expectations onto the adversary.
- Intentions and capabilities. The information gathered is about the intentions and capabilities of the adversary. Although this sounds simple, in practice it is very difficult. Of course it is much easier to gather information about capabilities, especially measurable ones, than about intentions. Political and military intentions are very easy to hide and change at the last minute.
- Organizational behavior. Organizations tend to ignore information due to poor coordination of various departments, seeking consensus and reducing internal tensions.
Strategic surprise
On October 6, 1973 Israel received the combined attack of Egypt and Syria. The surprise was not caused by a lack of information, quite the opposite. Israel's political and military leadership and intelligence officials had formed the belief that Egypt would not attack until it had solved the problem of air superiority. And Syria would not launch an attack without Egypt. The Israelis did not consider the extent of the humiliation felt by the Arabs, since the loss of their lands in 1967, which led to their determination to regain them.
The Israeli army after the initial surprise recovered and achieved impressive operational results. The war brought an earthquake to Israeli society, which had believed after 1967 that it was no longer in danger, and led to the fall of the government. It is interesting that the Agranat Commission formed to investigate responsibility, held the chief of staff, two lieutenant generals, a brigadier general and three lieutenant colonels responsible. The Prime Minister and the Minister of Defense were left in the dark, resulting in reactions.
Coming to the terrorist attacks of October 7, Hamas literally caught Israel asleep, whose deterrence collapsed. It is estimated that this time when responsibilities will be assigned, the political leadership will not remain immune. Hamas managed to inflict on Israel in one day casualties, both military and civilian, which are almost half of the casualties of the 1973 war, which lasted 19 days. In addition, Hamas has undermined the reputation that Israel is relatively invulnerable to mass-scale attacks. Finally, he brought the Palestinian issue back to the fore, simultaneously undermining the Abrahamic Accords.
Israel in 1973 had to face two regular armies and it did so successfully. Today, the situation is more complex, with many moving parts and many players in the region. Of course, this is not the first time that Israel has faced Hamas. In the last 15 years, it has carried out two ground operations in Gaza (2008 and 2014) and one air operation (2012).
Nevertheless, Israel's military strategy has been problematic. Unable to find a political solution to the protracted conflict with Hamas, he pursued a strategy that Israeli analysts have called "mowing the grass." That is, by targeting the leadership of terrorist organizations (along with some civilians) and bombing their infrastructure, he aimed to temporarily keep violence at low levels. In this way, Israel was buying some time until the next major operation, but igniting the radicalization of the Palestinians.
Israel's strategic dilemmas
Israel today is at a loss as to what strategy to pursue. Militarily it has the ability not only to "mow the grass" but also to dig the soil under the grass. However, any operational success, if not linked to a political solution for the Palestinians, is not going to last. Moreover, the strategy in previous years has elevated Hamas as the main representative of the Palestinians, after the discrediting of the Palestinian Authority.
On a purely military level, Israel faces four challenges:
- First, Hamas will be prepared. Even a limited invasion will have costs.
- Second, hostages add difficulty to any business plan.
- Third, the operational environment, a populated area and an extensive network of tunnels, poses additional problems to the Israeli campaign.
- Fourth, the risk of a front in the north with Hezbollah and an uprising in the West Bank will multiply the problems.
Greece and strategic surprise
Greece received a strategic surprise in 1974 with the Turkish invasion of Cyprus. Here we are not interested in conspiracy theories, nor whether Ioannidis was a traitor or was deceived. The Turkish invasion, however, is not mentioned in the literature on strategic surprise, we believe for two reasons: On the one hand, domestic strategic analyzes of modern Greek military history are absent, on the other hand, foreign scholars, possessed by military orientalism, do not consider our wars serious enough to deal with The exceptions prove the rule.
However, Greece and Cyprus did not feel the humiliation big enough to reoccupy the occupied part of Cyprus. Such a thing was never even heard as a distant prospect. Greece for the strategic surprise, implemented operationally with the first blow, she needs to be prepared not to be surprised again.
Offensively, we need innovative business concepts to be used simultaneously, sequentially or alternatively, without relying on just one. We have argued for the parameters of the first blow in an earlier article. Finally, we believe that Greece needs to reconsider its excessive reliance on the doctrine of deterrence. Deterrence is not a panacea and its operation in a conventional (non-nuclear) environment is problematic.
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