Those who remember the oil crises after 1970 understand well how energy instability translates into everyday life: queues at gas stations, soaring prices, pressure on the cost of living and ever-shrinking business margins. That is why what will happen "the next day" in Iran is not just a diplomatic or military issue but a matter of energy supply, economic stability and the international balance of power.
Iran is among the countries (3)η country) with the largest oil reserves in the world. Estimates indicate reserves in the hundreds of billions of barrels, making it a critical “player” in the supply of conventional hydrocarbons. This means that, if the country returns to normal export rates and international sanctions are eased, several million barrels per day could be added to the market (estimates vary widely, typically 1–3+ million barrels/day, depending on the scenario and degree of reintegration).
The obvious beneficial effect of such an offer would be a downward trend in energy prices: cheaper gasoline, lower heating costs, cheaper transportation and, consequently, lower costs in the production of food and services. For households with a fixed income and for businesses with high energy dependence, such a “breathing” in the price of energy translates directly into increased liquidity and relief. Macroeconomic effects could include lower structural inflation and an improvement in the trade balance of importing countries.
But the transition from political crisis to economic “normality” is neither immediate nor a given. There are three major challenges that determine the pace and scope of Iran’s eventual reintegration into the international economic environment:
1) Legalsettings and investments. Reconnecting Iranian oil to European and American markets requires lifting (or redefining) legal restrictions, nuclear agreements and compliance guarantees, and committing banks and insurance companies to reopen for transactions once considered “unthinkable.” Trust among financial institutions and insurance companies does not come with a law, but takes time, legal frameworks and transparent guarantees. At the same time, many parts of Iran’s energy system — from oil fields to export terminals and refineries — have suffered years of underinvestment and technological deterioration. Renewing infrastructure requires “billions” in capital and technology, often from Western companies, and for this to happen, political stability and legal certainty are needed.
2) Geostrategic confrontation and marine roads. The importance of the Persian Gulf and, in particular, the Strait of Hormuz as a corridor for a large proportion of the world’s seaborne oil trade (around 20%) remains critical. Any prolonged uncertainty in the region increases insurance premiums, prices and the tendency to reroute cargoes to longer and more expensive routes. The military security of the sea lanes, therefore, becomes a political-economic parameter: the presence of Forces (and in particular the assurance of naval alliances) will affect how quickly and at what cost the markets will accept Iranian supplies.
3) Institutional stability and political transition. The strong but uncertain “bet” of international resources is that a new, more “cooperative” political formation in Tehran could lead to a smooth reintegration. But this transition is extremely risky. Historical examples (such as the dissolution of the Soviet Union) show that change “overnight” does not guarantee homogeneous or rapid stabilization in every region. The new regime may take the form of a more market-oriented and international investment-friendly state, as happened in some Asian countries, or, conversely, be trapped in internal conflicts and regional tensions that will keep markets at bay. There are several possible scenarios for the “next day”:
- Optimal (stable reform path). If a relatively stable transitional arrangement is formed, with clear guarantees for nuclear control and legal commitments to international investors, then within 2–5 years significant cargoes could begin to flow to international markets with immediate benefit for consumers and a positive impact on the global economy. China would lose access to cheap oil after losing cheap Venezuelan oil and would be unable to produce at low cost and export products below cost, threatening the systemic disappearance of many industries around the world due to unfair competition. Also, Russia would not be able to finance the invasion of Ukraine with high oil prices. American and European infrastructure, construction and technology companies could undertake projects, creating jobs and incomes.
- Intermediate (cloudy, slow recovery). A prolonged period of uncertainty with partial sanctions relief and selective re-entry (via third-party financiers and buyers) will likely test prices, with shallower declines and higher volatility, while large foreign investments will be delayed. The market will face higher premiums and bank/insurer hesitation.
Γ. Worse (uncontrollable instability). If the transition is accompanied by internal armed conflict or widespread external blockage of flows, then prices could skyrocket in the short term. The impact on economies highly dependent on imported oil will be severe. In addition, geopolitical “winners” such as Russia (which wants high prices) or China (which has access to cheap crude) will readjust strategies, and the global system will face increased risk.
The “next day” in Iran can be interpreted as an opportunity or a global challenge, depending on how the political, economic and military management of the new situation is designed and implemented. If the transition offers stability, the consequences for the global economy will be decisive, from a reduction in energy costs to investment opportunities. On the contrary, if widespread instability prevails, the consequences will be very unfavorable and will deeply affect the energy, financial and social structures of many countries. The crucial parameter is institutional stability, and this depends as much on internal political choices as on international decisions for trust and cooperation.
Moreover, what is happening in the Middle East represents a systemic shift in the international order. Iran’s persistent attempt to revive its lost imperial influence in the Middle East through military armaments for almost 50 years has proven to be a wrong strategy for the country. In one weekend, all these efforts were lost. The projection of modern power is not about the ideology of each regime, but about alliances, supply chains, technology and speed. The US is showing that even if only a part of its military power is activated, the message becomes clear and in global politics, displays of force matter. The message also concerns other revisionist countries that are over-arming, at the expense of the well-being of their people, to revive their imperial aspirations, with Turkey as the next recipient.
photo Left: The national flag of Iran flies in the wind as debris lies scattered in the aftermath of an Israeli and US strike on a police station, amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, in Tehran, Iran, March 3, 2026. Majid Asgaripour/WANA (West Asia News Agency) via Reuters, https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/iranian-drones-strike-u-s-embassy-in-saudi-arabia-as-war-widens
