Dr. Konstantinos P. Balomenos
Political Scientist – Internationalist
This year marks 30 years since the Imia crisis, during which Greece was called upon to face one of the most serious national crises of the post-democratic period.
The Imia crisis was not just a heated incident, but a turning point on Greek foreign and defense policy, with long-term consequences for security and national deterrence.
Its outcome was exploited by Turkey to practically introduce the theory of "gray zones" in the Aegean, adversely altering Greece's strategic security environment and challenging its sovereignty.
In particular, the Imia crisis is perhaps the most characteristic example Waterloo communication, where the absence of a communication strategy undermined the overall management of the crisis and effectively canceled political and military options.
The facts showed that The outcome of a crisis is not only determined by operational capabilities, but also by the ability of political leadership to formulate clear strategic objectives, a coherent narrative and to communicate effectively. with all parties involved and public opinion.
In the case of Imia, however, none of this worked in a coordinated and effective manner.
From the beginning to the end of the crisis, Simitis government officials had not clearly identified what the real problem they were called upon to address was and began communicating without a defined stake.
Parallel, There was a fundamentally different approach to the process of dealing with the crisis between political and military leadership..
For military leadership, crises are resolved in the field. and their successful management is directly linked to the prestige, credibility, symbolic power of the Armed Forces and national deterrent power.
On the contrary, for the political leadership at the time and especially for Prime Minister Costas Simitis, Crises between democratic states are resolved politically, through dialogue and de-escalation, as he himself states (see: Simitis, Kostas Politics for a Creative Greece 1996-2004, Athens, Polis Publications, 2005, p. 62), Continuing tension would have serious consequences for the country's international image and economic stability..
The stakes of the Imia crisis were therefore completely different for the political and military leadership of Greece.
During the development of the crisis, there was no substantial communication between them, resulting in a communication gap. which played a decisive role in its unsuccessful outcome.
Specifically, a primary goal of the then Greek government was not the effective response to the crisis even with military operations, but how to minimize their responsibilities from the effects of the crisis, so that their vital political interests are not affected.
It is no coincidence, after all, that the efforts of the then government officials and Prime Minister Costas Simitis to downgrading the importance of the crisis.
In particular, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs Theodoros Pangalos, following the incident with the Turkish journalists of the Hurriyet newspaper who lowered the Greek flag in the great Imia and raised the Turkish one, in an interview with the newspaper "The Step» tried to downplay the issue by saying that "Much ado about nothing."
On the same subject, Mr. Pangalos, in his speech in Parliament on January 31, 1996, during the discussion of the programmatic statements of the Simitis government, emphasized that in the context of easing the crisis, The Greek side downplayed the incident and after the exchange of verbal communications considered the incident to be over. (See: Minutes of the House, 8th Period, Session 3, Session 17 of 31/1/1996, p. 3142).
In addition to, For then Prime Minister Costas Simitis, the crisis was a political issue and should be addressed through political means.
Specifically, as he himself states in his book (p. 63), "The choice to meet in the Prime Minister's Office and not in the special room of the Ministry of National Defense next to the operations room was made consciously. I wanted to avoid creating the impression that we were facing a war crisis. The problem was political and had to be addressed through political means and not through a military operation."
On the other side, The military leadership had a different approach to how to deal with the crisis.
Characteristic are what Admiral Christos Lymberis mentions in his book ""A journey through troubled seas" (p. 537), about this matter.
Specifically, he emphasizes: "The handling of the Greek-Turkish crisis of Imia, as a field of international relations, was within the competence of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and because the Greek crisis management model is prime minister-centric, the final direction was exercised by the prime minister.
The National Defense General Staff implemented political decisions that determined the actions of the Armed Forces.
For the reason that military movements in a period of crisis are monitored and interpreted by the other side and signal messages of escalation or de-escalation, the crisis management system provides for the exercise of closed political control of all military actions.
This reality, plus The rapid development of the situation necessitated the presence of the political team in the crisis management center (National Operations Center).
"Something like this never happened, because the prime minister denied it and we must admit that it worked negatively for Greece."
This choice was part of a more comprehensive approach by the government to crisis management, which, in addition to organizational and political failures, was also characterized by the absence of clearly defined communication goals.
As a result, communication management did not function in support of strategic choices, but often undermined them.
In this context, as mentioned in his speech to Parliament on January 31, 1996, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs Theodoros Pangalos (see: Parliament Minutes, 8th Period, 3rd Session, 17th Session, Wednesday, January 31, 1996, p. 3142), Greece's strategic objectives were the following:
- No negotiations with Turkey on all the issues they raise.
- Avoiding dialogue about the Imia islets.
- The imposition of a peaceful settlement of the fait accompli that had been created, in order to avoid war.
- Greece's non-commitment to the future in more general negotiations on Greek-Turkish relations.
The above objectives are also confirmed by what Prime Minister Costas Simitis states in his book (p.62).
Specifically, Costas Simitis points out the goal of avoiding war: "All these days I have of course been in constant communication and consultation with Messrs. Pangalos and Arsenis. I have given instructions of alertness and readiness, while at the same time emphasizing the need to avoid an armed confrontation."
In relation to the goal of avoiding negotiations, Kostas Simitis states: "Turkey's aim is to negotiate the issues it believes exist in the Aegean directly with Greece. This negotiation should not be imposed on us. On the other hand, however, we must also avoid conflict.", (see: book, p.65).
On the same subject, also in another part of his book (p. 66), Mr. Simitis states: "So if we wanted to avoid dialogue, we had to avoid both conflict and the concentration of forces in the region. We also agreed that appeals to the UN or NATO are not appropriate, because they would call us into direct consultation with Turkey." The only appropriate solution, we concluded, was the withdrawal of all military forces from the area and a return to the previous situation.».
The above strategic objectives of Greece, as stated by former Chief of the Hellenic National Defense General Staff Admiral Christos Lymberis in his book (p. 537), They were never discussed at a political-military level nor were they transmitted to the country's military leadership.
Also on a communication level, the above objectives were never made known nor communicated to any specific audience. Therefore, since the crisis managers (Greek government) did not disclose and communicate the goals of their high strategy, how was it possible for the executors of their decisions to understand what should be pursued in order to successfully resolve the crisis?
The ambiguity regarding strategic goals was inevitably reflected in the communication field, where The Greek government failed to adopt a coherent and credible communication strategy during the crisis.
The Greek government did not adopt a communication strategy based on "direct and frequent communication" with its specific audiences, the media and public opinion regarding the data and the evolution of the crisis.
Also, the internal conflicts of the top government officials who participated in the management of the crisis, combined with the many voices speaking during the development of the crisis and their different positions and statements, made the Greek government, in the perception of the expert public, the media and public opinion, a non-serious and unreliable channel of communication and information about the events of the crisis.
Characteristic is the self-criticism of then Prime Minister Costas Simitis regarding these weaknesses.
Specifically, during his speech to the PASOK Parliamentary Group on February 6, 1996 (See: "Simitis: War is necessary only where we cannot achieve defense by peaceful means", Newspaper FREE PRESS, Wednesday 7/2/1996, pp. 4 & 5), emphasized: "Let me now come to the handling of the case in terms of public opinion, the public image we demonstrated during the crisis and afterwards." The handling was not as satisfactory as it should have been."Our position should be presented more convincingly, more comprehensively and prevent reactions."
The Greek government's inability to effectively communicate its strategy to its specific audiences is outlined even more clearly by what Mr. Simitis mentions in his book. (p. 74). Specifically, he emphasizes: "A negative impression prevailed in the Union about our country, and this was due not only to the handling of the Skopje issue in the past, but also to the internal reactions that followed the Imia incident. A significant part of PASOK questioned the government's ability to handle national issues, New Democracy spoke of continued concessions towards Turkey, some media outlets broadcast news of a new heated incident, and all critics jointly argued that the government was very wrong to request the referral of Turkey to the International Court of Justice in The Hague."
In the same context, during the management of the Imia crisis, The Greek government sent conflicting and contradictory messages, which undermined its credibility both at home and abroad.
A typical example of this situation were the statements of the then Prime Minister Mr. Simitis on January 29 and 30, 1996, which simultaneously escalated and undermined the crisis.
Specifically, in the early hours of January 29, 1996, the national inter-branch military exercise “ALEXANDER-96” began, with a scenario of a Greek-Turkish crisis in the Aegean. On the same day, after Tansu Ciller’s announcement at the meeting of the Turkish National Security Council – that “Imia belongs to Turkey and not a single stone of its territory will be given up” – Kostas Simitis raised the tone, making a harsh and intensely aggressive statement.
In particular, he stated: "To this and to any aggressive nationalism, we respond that Greece's reaction will be intense, immediate and effective. We have the means and we will use them without hesitation. We do not accept any questioning of our sovereign rights whatsoever. Let them not be fooled.".
This statement, combined with the start of the "ALEXANDER-96" exercise and the disembarkation of the Greek frogmen at the great Imia, signaled to the opposite side of the Aegean, but also to the specific communities of Greece, that Greece was escalating the crisis and that it wanted the confrontation to be resolved on the battlefield.
Despite these statements and moves, the Prime Minister, however, during his speech to parliament on January 29, 1996, made a statement that actually sent Turkey yet another contradictory message [see: Parliament Minutes, 8th Period, Session 3, Session 5, Monday, January 29, 1996, pp. 3087 & 3088].
Specifically, in his speech, Prime Minister Costas Simitis defined Greece's relationship with Turkey and emphasized: "As for Turkey, Greece recognizes the necessity of Turkey's European orientation. Such a perspective must be directly linked to respect for human rights, the principles of democracy and the political values of Europe. The basis of Greek-Turkish relations remain the rules of international law and international treaties and the categorical will of Greece to defend its sovereign rights.".
Commenting on the above report, we could say that in the given circumstances it is inappropriate and conveys a wrong message to Turkey and the specific public of Greece.
In short, when you are escalating a crisis and planning military engagement, it is a fatal mistake to declare that you support your opponent's national strategic choices.
Also, at 10:45 in the morning of the 30thth In January 1996, a meeting was held in the Prime Minister's office in Parliament, with the participation of the Ministers of National Economy, Defense, Foreign Affairs, Interior, Press, and the Chief of the Hellenic National Defense General Staff. The topic was the assessment of the situation and the decision-making for the management of the crisis.
It was not a KYSEA meeting and no minutes were kept. The failure to convene the KYSEA and the meeting in the Prime Minister's office in parliament are not consistent with the climate of escalation. and the statement of 29th January by the Prime Minister and constitute yet another contradictory message sent to Turkey.
In the same context, shortly before the meeting in parliament, Prime Minister Costas Simitis made a statement in a completely different tone from that of the 29th January.
Specifically, he stated that: "If Turkey withdraws its ships, then we will withdraw ours too." Additionally, in the meeting that followed in his office, the Prime Minister asked that things remain as they are and that actions that escalate the crisis be avoided (see: Lymberis' book, p. 566).
Furthermore, The clash of military escalation moves with diplomatic de-escalation statements, combined with the Prime Minister and the government's briefing on television about the occupation of Eastern Imia and the downing of the helicopter, fully demonstrated the confusion, uncoordinated communication and lack of a clear strategy..
Simultaneously, the Prime Minister's subsequent statements and PASOK ministers after the de-escalation of the crisis, which attributed responsibility to the armed forces or thanked the US, reinforced the image of weakness and lack of credibility of the Greek government, completely deconstructing its narrative to specific audiences, the media and public opinion.
In conclusion, the lesson from Waterloo regarding the communication management of the Imia crisis is clear: In the modern business environment, strategic communication is a critical power factor.
The effective management of an international crisis depends not only on the outcome of operations on the ground, but also on a country's ability to communicate strategically., with clarity, consistency and reliability.
The Greek government's failure to do so was not only costly politically, but it undermined national deterrence and security.
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